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Agricultural Subsidy Policies Fail to Deal with Child Labour under 
Agricultural Dualism: What could be the Alternative Policies? 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Abject poverty has been attributed to be the root cause behind the widespread existence of child 
labour in the developing countries. Therefore, it is a commonly held view that poverty alleviation 
programs should vigorously be resorted to for mitigating the problem.1 Empirical studies have 
revealed that the incidence of child labour has decreased satisfactorily in most of the developing 
economies although incomes of the poorer section of the population have not changed 
significantly in absolute terms over the last two decades.2, 3 
 
The problem of child labour has two sides: demand and supply. Countries with high incidence of 
poverty undertake policies which are designed to increase earning opportunities of the poor. 
Consequently, these policies are expected to produce favourable effect on the incidence of child 
labour through the supply side. The empirical findings that the incidence of child labour in the 
developing nations has decreased satisfactorily although poverty has not changed much during 
the liberalized economic regime suggest that favourable effect on child labour must have come 
from the demand side. Why the policies designed to eradicate child labour through the supply 
side of the problem have not been able to mitigate the problem satisfactorily urgently calls for 
theoretical explanations.  The pertinent question is then whether the supply side policies that 
target the child labour problem through poverty eradication have been designed appropriately.  
                                                          
1
 See World Development Report (1995), Basu and Van (1998), Basu (2000) and Bonnet (1993) among 
others. 
  
2
 ILO (2012) has reported that the number of child labour in the 5-17 age group declined sharply by 32% 
during the period 2000 to 2012.  Child labour incidence has declined from 16% in 2000 to 10.6% in 2012.  
The decline is sharpest for Latin America & Caribbean and Asia and Pacific, whereas Sub-Saharan Africa 
registered very small decline in activity rates. 
 
3
 See, for example, Wade (2004), Reddy and Minoiu (2005), Wade and Wolf (2002), Khan (1998) and 
Tendulkar et al. (1996). 
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According to ILO (2012) the concentration of child labour is the highest in the rural sector of a 
developing economy and child labour is used intensively directly or indirectly in agriculture.4 
Besides, agricultural dualism is a common symptom of the developing countries. The distinction 
between advanced and backward agriculture can be made on the basis of inputs used, economies 
of scale, efficiency and elasticity of substitution between different factors of production. In 
backward agriculture, the production techniques are primitive, use of capital is very low and 
child labour is used highly intensively because of their ability to substitute adult labour in almost 
every activities and lower wages relative to adult labour. Farming in backward agriculture is 
mostly done by using bullocks and ploughs and the cattle-feeding is entirely done by child 
labour.5 Besides, during peak season when there is a temporary scarcity of adult labour demand 
for child labour remains high. Children are often used in the family farms for helping adult 
members of the family. It would be quite natural to assume that as the system of agriculture 
adopts more labour-saving technology the demand for child labour would fall.  Use of modern 
machines like tractors replaces traditional ploughing done by bullocks and therefore eliminates 
children’s requirement in cattle feeding. It is now well documented how introduction of good 
practices in agriculture using more labour-saving technology can reduce and eliminate use of 
child labour in agriculture.  Labour and energy-saving technologies through farm mechanization 
minimize and eliminate use of labour in all farm operations as well food storage and utilization. 
FAO’s intervention in countries like Mali, Malawi, Cambodia and Tanzania has been very 
successful in this regard.6 
 
Agriculture in many countries is supported by governments’ subsidies in the form of price 
support, export subsidy, credit support, energy support etc. In a developing country like India, 
subsidy policies are adopted so as to benefit the poorer section of the working population who 
are the potential suppliers of child labour. It is, therefore, natural to expect that these fiscal 
                                                          
4
 According to the ILO (2012) more than 59 per cent of economically active children in the developing 
countries are engaged in agriculture and allied sectors. In case of India this figure is as high as 68 percent 
(National Sample Survey Organisation 2004-05). 
 
5
 See Gupta (2000) in this context. 
 
6 See FAO (2012) and Mwamandi and Seiffert (2012) for details.  
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measures will raise the earning opportunities of the poor households which in turn will lower the 
supply of child labour by these families through positive income effect. However, the matter is 
not as straightforward as it appears to be at the first sight. This is because apart from their impact 
on adult wages, these policies affect the output composition of different sectors and the demand 
for child labour and therefore earning opportunities by children as well. A subsidy policy in any 
form designed to benefit backward agriculture will result in a higher demand for child labour and 
raise the use of child labour in the economy. Despite a positive income effect due to increase in 
adult wages, the net effect on child labour may be perverse if the child wage rises substantially 
resulting from increased demand. On the contrary, a subsidy given to advanced agriculture leads 
to a (an) contraction (expansion) of backward (advanced) agriculture lowers the demand for 
child labour in the economy and is expected to mitigate the child labour incidence through the 
demand side effect. However, in both of these cases, the consequence on the welfare of the poor 
families would be ambiguous. More importantly, these subsidy policies have serious 
distortionary effects on the economy as a whole and, therefore, should not ideally be 
recommended for eliminating child labour and improving the welfare of the poor working 
families.  
 
Alternatively, one can think of policies like non-distortionay direct cash transfer to the poor child 
labour-supplying families and/or acceleration of economic growth through foreign direct 
investment (FDI) as means to combat the menace of child labour and to improve welfare of the 
poor families.7    
 
                                                          
7
 The possible favourable consequences of these two policies on child labour and family welfare have 
been discussed in Chaudhuri (2010) and Chaudhuri and Mukhopadyay (2014). However, the policy of 
economic growth through FDI might produce a few undesirable effects on the economy. We are thankful 
to the anonymous referee for pointing these out. Some of these effects have been discussed in Chaudhuri 
and Mukhopadhyay (2014) in details.  See also footnote 46 in this context. 
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The existing theoretical literature on child labour8, however, has not so far paid sufficient 
attention to identify both the demand and supply side effects of the direct and indirect poverty 
alleviation programs on the problem of child labour in a developing economy with agricultural 
dualism. The main objective of the present paper is to examine how different agricultural subsidy 
policies that are primarily designed to eradicate poverty in agriculture affect the incidence of 
child labour in the society. We also analyze how these policies impinge on the welfare of the 
child labour-supplying families. A three-sector full-employment general equilibrium model with 
child labour and agricultural dualism has been considered for the analytical purpose. The 
economy is divided into two agricultural and one manufacturing sectors. One of the two 
agricultural sectors is backward agriculture (sector 2) that uses child labour. However, in 
advanced agriculture child labour is not used.9, 10  In this set-up we have examined the 
consequences of subsidy policies to agriculture, irrespective of whether backward or advanced, 
designed to benefit the poorer section of the working population on the incidence of child labour 
and welfare of the child labour-supplying families. Our analysis has found that a price subsidy to 
backward agriculture is most likely to produce a perverse effect on the child labour incidence 
even though it raises the non-child labour income and welfare of the child labour-supplying 
families. On the other hand, the effect of a price or a credit subsidy policy to advanced 
agriculture on child labour is ambiguous although it affects family welfare adversely. As 
alternative policies we have also studied the efficacies of a direct cash transfer policy11 to poor 
                                                          
8
 See Basu an Van (1998), Basu (1999), Gupta (2000, 2002), Jaferey and Lahiri (2002), Ranjan (1999, 
2001), Baland and Robinson (2000), Chaudhuri (2010), Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2006, 2007), Dwibedi 
and Chaudhuri (2010) among others. In the literature the supply of child labour has been attributed to 
factors such as abject poverty, lack of educational facilities and poor quality of schooling, capital market 
imperfection, parental attitudes including the objectives to maximize present income etc.   
 
9
 As the advanced agricultural sector uses mechanised techniques of production and uses agricultural 
machineries like tractors, seeders/planters, sprayers and harvesters etc. one can probably assume away the 
use of child labour. 
 
10
 Using data drawn from a household survey for two Indian states (Uttar Pradesh and Bihar) carried out 
by the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS),  Self and Grabowskai (2007) 
reported  how  use of   mechanical technologies which are generally labour-saving in nature significantly 
reduces the use of child labour in agriculture.  
 
11
 We are thankful to an anonymous referee of this journal for his/her suggestion to consider cash transfer 
as an alternative policy while commenting on an earlier version of the paper.  
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working household and a policy of economic growth through FDI on the problem of child labour 
and family welfare. Our results suggest that the direct cash transfer policy, which impinges on 
the incidence of child labour through the supply side, will be effective not only in mitigating the 
problem but also in improving family welfare. On the other hand, the policy of economic growth 
through FDI produces favourable effect on child labour both from the demand and supply sides 
of the problem. This also improves welfare of the poor families. Therefore, our findings indicate 
that indirect poverty eradication programs through different agricultural subsidies cannot be the 
right strategy to combat child labour and improve the conditions of the poor people. The best 
way to achieve both the targets simultaneously would be to resorting to the direct cash transfer 
policy to the poor people engaged in agriculture and/or to go for higher economic growth 
through FDI.    
 
2. The model 
 
 
We consider a small open economy with three sectors: two agricultural and one manufacturing. 
The two agricultural sectors produce two exportable agricultural commodities.12 Sector 1 is the 
advanced agricultural sector that produces its output, 1X , by means of adult labour ( )L , land ( )N  
and capital ( )K . Capital used in this sector includes both physical capital like tractors and 
harvesters and working capital required for purchasing material inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, 
weedicides etc. The other agricultural sector, we call it backward agriculture (sector 2), produces 
its output, 2X , by using adult labour, child labour ( )CL  and land. As the backward agriculture 
uses primitive production techniques, we make the simplifying assumption that sector 2 does not 
require capital in its production. The land-output ratios in sector 1 and sector 2 ( 1Na and 2Na ) are 
assumed to be technologically given. This assumption not only simplifies the algebra but also 
can be defended as follows. In one hectare of land the number of saplings that can be sown is 
given. There should be a minimum gap between two saplings and land cannot be substituted by 
other factors of production.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
12
 These two may be different commodities or the same product with different quality and quite naturally 
their prices at the international markets are different.   
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It is sensible to assume that the backward agricultural sector is more adult labour-intensive vis-à-
vis the advanced agricultural sector with respect to land. This implies that 2 1
2 1
L L
N N
a a
a a
> , 
where sjia are input-output ratios. Available empirical evidence suggests that in developing 
economies child labour is used intensively directly or indirectly in backward agriculture that uses 
primitive production techniques. The advanced agricultural sector, on the other hand, uses 
mechanised techniques of production and does not require child labour in production. Child 
labour is, therefore, specific to backward agriculture.13 Both the agricultural sectors produce 
exportable commodities.14 In the two agricultural sectors adult workers receive a competitive 
wage, W .  Sector 3 is the import-competing sector that produces a manufacturing 
commodity, 3X
 
by means of adult labour and capital. As it is the formal sector of the economy it 
does not use child labour due to legal reasons.15 It faces a unionised labour market where 
workers receive a contractual wage W withW W> . The adult labour allocation mechanism is as 
follows. Adult workers first try to get employment in the manufacturing sector that offers the 
higher wage and those who are unable to find employment in the said sector are automatically 
absorbed in the two agricultural sectors, as the wage rate there is perfectly flexible.16 Capital is 
                                                          
13
 See footnote 15 in this context.   
 
14
 See footnote 12.  
 
15
 According to ILO (2012) more than 59 per cent of economically active children in the developing 
countries are engaged in agriculture and allied sectors and less than 8 per cent are involved in 
manufacturing and nerly 32 percent in services. Apart from agriculture, child workers are mainly used in 
informal manufacturing sector which constitutes unregistered units that mainly produce intermediate 
goods for the formal manufacturing sector. Child labour is also often used in non-traded services like 
domestic help and prostitution which are consumed primarily by the richer section of the population. 
Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2007) deals with this type of child labour. As our objective is to focus on child 
labour in dualistic agriculture we have not separately considered an informal manufacturing sector with 
child labour. However, even if one introduces an informal manufacturing sector where child labour, adult 
labour and capital are used to produce a non-traded input for the formal sector the basic results of this 
paper still hold under different sufficient conditions containing terms of relative intensities in which child 
labour and other two inputs are used in the two child labour-using sectors.  
16
 A pertinent question in this context is what mechanism stops the entire labour force being employed in 
the higher paid formal sector (sector 3), especially when we are considering a small open economy that is 
a price-taker at the international market. If we look at the price system of the model we find that capital is 
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completely mobile between sector 1 and sector 3. Owing to the small open economy assumption 
prices of all commodities (e.g. 2P and 3P ) are given internationally. Competitive markets, except 
the formal sector labour market, constant returns to scale (CRS) technologies with positive and 
diminishing marginal productivities of inputs17 and full-employment of resources are assumed. 
Finally, commodity 1, the price of which is also given internationally, is chosen as the 
numeraire.  
 
The following three equations present the zero-profit conditions relating to the three sectors of 
the economy. 
1 1 1 1L N KWa Ra ra+ + =                                                                                                  (1)                                                         
2 2 2 2L C C NWa W a Ra P+ + =                                                                                                (2)  
3 3 3L KWa ra P+ =                                                                                          (3)    
where R , r and CW  stand for return to land, return to capital and child wage rate, respectively. 
The other symbols have already been defined.  
 
Complete utilization of adult labour, capital, land and child labour imply the following four 
equations, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
used by sector 1 and sector 3. The return to capital, r , is determined from equation (3) as W and 3P are 
exogenously given. Once r is determined the factor coefficients in sector 3 i.e. 3La and 3Ka are also 
determined. Sector 1 uses 1 1Ka X units of capital. All other factor prices and factor-coefficients are 
determined from the remaining two price equations and the factor endowments equations. As commodity 
prices and factor endowments are given all other factor prices and factor coefficients are also given. Now 
sector 3 actually gets 1 1( )KK a X− amount of capital which in turn can produce 1 1
3
( )K
K
K a X
a
−
units of 
good 3 and can at best employ 1 1 3
3
( )K L
K
K a X
a
a
−
 
number of workers. For a wide range of parameter values the 
labour endowment, L , is greater than 1 1 3
3
( )K L
K
K a X
a
a
−
. This is the case which we are considering. Therefore, 
owing to scarcity of capital all workers are not employed in sector 3. However, the employment level in 
this sector rises if the capital stock of the economy goes up.  
 
17
 The land-output ratios in the two agricultural sectors ( 1Na and 2Na ) have been assumed to be 
technologically given. However, the other inputs exhibit CRS between themselves.  
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LXaXaXa LLL =++ 332211                                                                                             (4) 
KXaXa KK =+ 3311                                                                                                           (5) 
NXaXa NN =+ 2211                                                                                                           (6) 
CC LXa =22                                                                                                                        (7) 
While the economy is endowed with given levels of adult labour, land and capital18, the 
aggregate supply of child labour, CL , is endogenously determined from the utility maximizing 
behavior of the households.   
 
2.1. Household behaviour  
 
Supply function of child labour is derived from the utility maximizing behaviour of the 
representative altruistic household. We assume that all working families are identical in every 
respect and each household consists of only one adult member and n  number of children. Adult 
workers who work in the higher paid manufacturing sector earn sufficiently higher wage such 
that they do not send their children to work19.   On the contrary, labourers who are engaged in 
the two agricultural sectors earn a low competitive wage which is less than the critical wage20 
(Basu and Van (1998)) and therefore send many of their children to the job market to supplement 
                                                          
18
  The capital endowment of the economy may, however, increase in the presence of either foreign direct 
investment (FDI) or domestic capital accumulation.   
 
19
 Basu and Van (1998) have shown that if child labour and adult labour are substitutes (Substitution 
Axiom) and if child leisure is a luxury commodity to the poor households (Luxury Axiom), unfavourable 
adult labour market, responsible for low adult wage rate, is the driving force behind the incidence of child 
labour. According to the Luxury Axiom, there exists a critical level of adult wage rate, and any adult 
worker earning below this wage rate, considers himself as poor and does not have the luxury to send his 
offspring to schools. He is forced to send his children to the job market to supplement low family income 
out of sheer poverty. 
 
20
 We can also quantify this critical value in our model. From equation (10) we can say that 0Cl =  if 
(1 ) Cn WW γ
γ
−
≥ . 
10 
 
low family income. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that capital-owners and land-owners 
are separate classes and they do not supply any child labour.21  
 
The supply function of child labour by each poor working family is determined from the utility-
maximizing behaviour of the representative altruistic household who works as wage labour in 
either of the two agricultural sectors. The altruistic adult member of the family (guardian) 
decides the number of children to be sent to the work place ( )Cl . The utility function of the 
representative household is given by 
))(,,,( 321 ClnCCCUU −=                                                                                                   
The household derives utility from the consumption of the three commodities, iC s for 1, 2,3i = ; 
and from the children’s leisure. For analytical simplicity let us consider the following Cobb-
Douglas type utility function for each household.  
γρβα )()()()( 321 ClnCCCAU −=                                                                                      (8) 
with 0>A , 0,,,1 >> γρβα ; and, .1)( =+++ γρβα                        
It satisfies all the standard properties and it is homogeneous of degree 1.  
 
The household maximizes its utility subject to the following budget constraint. 
1 2 2 3 3 ( )C CC PC PC W l W+ + = +                                                                                      (9) 
where, W is the income of the adult worker and CC lW
 
measures the income from child labour. 
Note that commodity 1 has been considered to be the numeraire so that 1 1P = .   
 
Maximizing the utility function with respect to its arguments and subject to the above budget 
constraint and solving for Cl the following family child labour supply function can be derived.
22
 
[(1 ) ( / )]C Cl n W Wγ γ= − −                                                                                             (10) 
                                                          
21
 Alternatively, one can assume that rental incomes are equally divided among the L number of working 
families. Consequently, share of rental incomes enters into the household maximization exercise. 
 
22
 See Appendix I for mathematical derivations. 
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A rise in W , produces a positive income effect so that the adult worker chooses more leisure for 
his children and therefore decides to send a fewer number of children to the place of work. An 
increase in CW , on the other hand, implies increased opportunity cost of leisure and hence 
produces a negative price effect. This leads to a decrease in children’s leisure and hence raises 
the supply of child labour by each family.23 
 
In our model there are )( 33 XaLL LI −=  number of adult workers engaged in the two agricultural 
sectors and each of them sends Cl  number of children to workplace. Thus, the aggregate supply 
function of child labour in the economy is given by                                                                  
3 3[(1 ) ( / )]( )C C LL n W W L a Xγ γ= − − −                                                                       (11)                                                                        
 
 
2.2.   The General Equilibrium Analysis 
 
 
Using (11), equation (7) can be rewritten as     
2 2 3 3[(1 ) ( / )]( )C C La X n W W L a Xγ γ= − − −                                                                     (7.1) 
 
The general equilibrium structure of the economy is represented by equations (1) – (6), (7.1) and 
(11). There are eight endogenous variables in the system: 1 2 3, , , , , ,CW W R r X X X
 
and CL . The 
parameters in the system are: 2 3, , , , , , , , ,P P L K N W α β ρ γ and n . Equations (1) − (3) constitute 
the price system. This is an indecomposable system with three price equations and four factor 
prices, , ,CW W r and R . So factor prices, except r , depend on both commodity prices and factor 
endowments. Given the unionized wage, W , r  is determined from equation (3). Now 
1 2, , , ,CW W R X X  and 3X are simultaneously obtained from equation (1), (2), (4) – (6) and (7.1).  
Finally, CL is determined from (11).            
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 It may be checked that the results of this paper hold for any utility function generating a supply 
function of child labour that satisfies these two properties.  
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3. Comparative Statics 
 
 
As discussed earlier agriculture in many countries including the developing ones agriculture, 
irrespective of whether backward or advanced, is supported by different government subsidies. 
The primary objective of such a fiscal support in a developing economy is poverty alleviation. 
As these policies are designed to benefit the poorer section of the working population, 
conventional wisdom suggests that these measures will raise the adult income of the poor 
households which in turn will put a brake on the problem of child labour in the society. This 
section is aimed at examining the efficacy of a price subsidy policy either to backward or to 
advanced agriculture in mitigating the child labour problem and in improving welfare of the 
child labour-supplying families.  
 
For determining the consequences of a price subsidy policy to backward agriculture, captured 
through an increase in 2P , on factor prices and output composition of the economy after totally 
differentiating equations (1), (2), (4) – (6) and (7.1) and solving we  can establish the following 
proposition.24   
Proposition 1: A price subsidy to backward agriculture leads to (i) increases in both adult 
wage,W , and child wage, CW ; (ii) a fall in the )/( CWW  ratio and an expansion (a contraction) of 
backward (advanced) agriculture. The manufacturing sector contracts if 
121 1
2 1{ } 0.KL N L LLNLS Sλ λ λ+ ≥
25
  
 
Proposition 1 can be explained in economic terms in the following fashion. As r  is determined 
from the zero-profit condition for sector 3 (equation (3)) and remains unchanged despite an 
increase in 2P , sector 1 and sector 2 together can effectively be regarded as a Modified 
                                                          
24
 See Appendix II for detailed derivations. 
 
25
 Here kjiS is the degree of substitution between factors j and i in the k th sector with 0>kjiS for ij ≠ ; 
and, 0kjjS < while jiλ is the allocative share of j th input in i th sector. 
Besides, 12 1 2 1 2( ) 0N L L NNLλ λ λ λ λ= − >  as backward agriculture (sector 2) is more adult labour-intensive 
vis-à-vis advanced agriculture (sector 1) with respect to land. 
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Hechscher-Ohlin subsystem (MHOSS) because they use two common inputs: adult labour and 
land. The modification is due to the fact that apart from adult labour and land, sector 2 uses child 
labour and sector 1 uses capital as inputs.  An increase in 2P  lowers the rate of return to land, R , 
and raises the adult wage, W following a Stolper-Samuelson type  effect, as sector 2 is more adult 
labour-intensive than sector 1 with respect to land. As the adult wage rate increases producers in 
sector 1 substitute adult labour by capital while their counterparts in sector 2 substitute adult 
labour by child labour. As the adult labour-output ratios ( 1La and 2La ) in the two agricultural 
sectors fall the availability of adult labour to the MHOSS rises which in turn produces an 
expansionary (a contractionary) effect on sector 2 (sector 1) following a Rybczynski type effect. 
As backward agriculture expands the demand for child labour increases as child labour is 
specific to that sector. This raises the child wage rate ( CW ). As both W and CW increase there 
would be two opposite effects on the supply of child labour by each family. It is easy to check 
that the proportionate increase in child wage rate is greater than that in adult wage so that 
)/( CWW falls.26  What happens to sector 3 will be determined by movement of capital between 
sector 1 and sector 3. As adult wage rate increases, with given rate of interest and constant land 
coefficient, wage-rental ratio in the advanced agricultural sector increases and producer 
substitute adult labour by capital resulting in an increase in 1Ka . But as sector 1 has contracted the 
net effect on the use of capital in this sector is ambiguous. However, it can be proved that the use 
of capital increases (decreases) in sector 1 (sector 3) under the sufficient condition 
that 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS Sλ λ λ+ ≥ . Consequently, sector 3 contracts.
27
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 This result is consistent with specific factor models. For an understanding of how return to 
intersectorally mobile factors and specific factors react to changes in relative commodity prices, one can 
go through Jones (1971). See Appendix II for mathematical proof.  
 
27
 Note that the capital-output ratio in sector 3 ( 3Ka ) remains unchanged as r does not change. 
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3.1  Price subsidy to backward agriculture, incidence of child labour and family 
 welfare 
 
For examining the implication of a price subsidy policy to backward agriculture on the incidence 
of child labour in the economy we use the aggregate child labour supply function, which is given 
by equation (11). We note that any policy affects the supply of child labour in two ways: (i) 
through a change in the size of the adult labour force employed in the two agricultural sectors, 
)( 33 XaLL LI −= , as these families are considered to be the suppliers of child labour; and, (ii) 
through a change in Cl (the number of child workers supplied by each poor family), which results 
from a change in the ( / )CW W ratio. Differentiating equation (11) the following proposition can 
be proved.28 
 
 Proposition 2: A price subsidy policy directed towards backward agriculture worsens the 
problem of child labour in the economy either if 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS Sλ λ λ+ ≥ ; or if, 
2 1 2 1
LC KL CC LLS S S S≥ .  
 
As explained previously, a price subsidy policy to backward agriculture lowers the 
)/( CWW ratio, which in turn increases the supply of child labour from each poor working family. 
On the other hand, as the formal sector contracts in terms of output and employment (under the 
sufficient condition mentioned earlier) the number of poor working families, which are 
considered to be the suppliers of child labour, )( 33 XaL L− , increases.   So, we have a situation 
where there are more poor families each supplying an increased number on child worker. 
Therefore, a price subsidy to backward agriculture aggravates the problem of child labour in the 
society.  
 
We now turn our attention to examine implication of a price subsidy policy to backward 
agriculture on the welfare of the child labour-supplying families. We capture this in terms of the 
                                                          
28
 This has been mathematically proved in Appendix IV. 
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family utility function (equation (8)). After substituting the optimum values of consumption of 
commodities ( 1 2,C C and 3C ) and children’s leisure ( )Cn l−  in the family utility function, totally 
differentiating and rearranging terms the following proposition29 can be established. 
Proposition 3: A price subsidy policy to backward agriculture unambiguously improves the 
welfare of each child labour-supplying family. 
  
A price subsidy to backward agriculture raises both the adult wage, W  and child wage, CW . This 
generates income effect which leads to increased consumption of all the physical commodities 
( 1 2,C C and 3C ). The children’s leisure, ( )Cn l− , also increases due to the positive income effect. 
But, as the opportunity cost of leisure ( CW ) has increased, children’s leisure falls due to a 
negative price effect. As )/( CWW
 
ratio falls, the price effect dominates over the income effect. 
The net outcome would be a decrease in children’s leisure and hence an increase in the supply of 
child labour ( Cl ) by each family. This works negatively on welfare of the family. However, our 
analysis shows that the increase in family welfare caused due to increases in physical 
commodities dominates over the decrease in household utility resulting from a fall in children’s 
leisure. Hence, family welfare unambiguously improves. 
 
3.2  Price subsidy to advanced agriculture, incidence of child labour and family 
 welfare 
 
A policy of directly subsidizing advanced agriculture in the form of a price and/or a credit 
subsidy will be effective in lessening the gravity of the child labour problem but at the cost of 
lowering the adult wage rate and family welfare. A mere inspection of the price system 
(equations (1) – (3)) reveals that a price and/or a credit subsidy to advanced agriculture 
effectively raises the relative price of commodity 1. This produces a Stolper-Samuelson effect in 
the MHOSS that results in an increase in the return to land, R  and a decrease in the adult wage, 
W  as sector 1 is more land-intensive  relative to sector 2 with respect to adult labour. This 
produces an expansionary (a contractionary) effect on sector 1 (sector 2). As sector 2 contracts 
                                                          
29
 For mathematical derivation see Appendix V. 
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the demand for child labour goes down as it is specific to this sector. Consequently, the child 
wage rate falls. From the standard trade-theoretic result it follows that the return to the specific 
factor (child labour) falls at a higher rate relative to that of the intersectorally mobile factor (adult 
labour). Consequently, the )/( CWW
 
ratio rises. This lowers the supply of child labour by each 
poor working family, ( )( )equation 0   1Cl . It can be shown30 that under a few alternative 
sufficient conditions sector 3 expands.  So, we have a situation where there are a fewer families 
with each of them supplying a lower number of child workers. Consequently, the aggregate 
supply of child labour falls. On the other hand, we have found that bothW and CW fall due to this 
policy. Hence, the aggregate income of each family unequivocally plummets as Cl falls too. As 
family welfare is a positive function of the aggregate income, the well-being of each child 
labour-supplying family worsens although children’s leisure rises due to price effect.  
 
This establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 4: A price and/or a credit subsidy policy to advanced agriculture succeeds in 
bringing down the prevalence of child labour in the society under the sufficient condition 
that 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS Sλ λ λ+ ≥ . However, this policy lowers family welfare of the child labour-
supplying families.   
 
So, our results indicate that a subsidy policy, either to backward agriculture or to advanced 
agriculture, cannot simultaneously mitigate the incidence of child labour and improve welfare of 
the poor families.31  
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 Interested readers can easily check this after going through Appendices II and III or can obtain proofs 
from the authors on request. 
 
31
 Additionally, different subsidies distort relative prices of commodities and consequently lead to 
misallocation of economic resources between the sectors which would affect social welfare of the 
economy adversely.  
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4. Quest for alternative policies 
 
A pertinent question at this juncture is what alternative policy (ies) we can recommend that 
would simultaneously be effective in combating the problem of child labour and in improving 
welfare of the poor families, especially when the conventional subsidy policies fail to deliver the 
goods. In this connection, we would like to examine the efficacies of (i) a direct cash transfer to 
poor families; and, (ii) a policy economic growth through FDI on both child labour and welfare 
of poor families.32  
 
4.1       Direct cash transfer to poor households 
 
The recent trend worldwide has been to move away from the distortionary market invention 
mechanism by a welfare-state through traditional subsidies towards decoupled income support 
preferably in the form of direct cash transfer for more egalitarian distribution of income. The 
preference for a direct cash transfer is implicit in the rules of the WTO agreement as well. The 
reason for this is that in economic theory market interventions through subsidies distort trade and 
production whereas such effects are minimal for decoupled income support. India, for example, 
has started implementing direct cash transfer for some of its subsidy programs to target groups 
through the “Aadhaar scheme”.33 
 
We analyze the effect of a direct cash transfer given to poor households by introducing a lump-
sum per cash transfer to each poor family of the amount 0G > . This per capita cash transfer, G , 
will be added to family income from non-child labour sources. This will lead to a family child 
labour supply function as follows.34 
                                                          
32
 We are grateful to the anonymous referee for very useful and constructive comments on these issues.  
 
33
 It is a centralised electronic benefit transfer system to undertake transfer of benefits (like old age 
pension, social security pension etc.) and subsidies directly to the beneficiaries, by way of crediting to 
their bank accounts. See http://www.npci.org.in/AEPSOverview.aspx and www.apmaheshbank.com/faq-
and-mandate.doc for more details. 
 
34
 From equation (12) it is evident that 0Cl =  if 
(1 )( ) Cn WW G γ
γ
−
+ ≥ . 
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                                                                                (12) 
 
Apart from its usual properties as discussed earlier (equation 10) family child labour is now 
influenced by the amount of the direct cash transfer, G , by the government.  A rise in G  
produces a positive income effect so that the adult worker chooses more leisure for his children 
and therefore decides to send a fewer number of children to the workplace. This is the direct 
effect of cash transfer on child labour.  
 
The modified aggregate supply function of child labour would be                                             
3 3[(1 ) {( ) / }]( )C C LL n W G W L a Xγ γ= − − + −                                                         (11.1)                                                                       
 
For determining the consequences of the cash transfer policy on factor prices, output 
composition and aggregate supply of child labour after totally differentiating equations (1), (2), 
(4) – (7), (8) and (11.1), solving and simplifying we can establish the following proposition.35   
Proposition 5: An increase in direct cash transfer to poor families leads to (i) a fall in adult 
wage ( )W ; (ii) an increase in aggregate income from non-child sources (W G+ ); (iii) a fall in  
child wage ( )CW ; (iv) a contraction of the formal manufacturing sector; (v) a lower incidence of 
child labour ( CL ); and, (vi) an improvement in welfare of each child labour-supplying family.  
 
We now interpret these results in economic terms. An increase in direct cash transfer lowers the 
supply of child labour by each poor family through a direct positive income effect at 
givenW and CW . This lowers the aggregate supply of child labour given the output composition 
of the economy. However,W , CW  and the output composition would not change remain 
unchanged. This is because of the following reasons. Backward agriculture being the only sector 
that uses child labour contracts and releases adult labour and land which would expand the 
advanced agricultural sector. As advanced agriculture is less adult labour-intensive relative to 
backward agriculture both W  and CW would fall. Although W falls, the aggregate income of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
35
 See Appendix VI  for mathematical derivations. 
 
[(1 ) {( ) / }]C Cl n W G Wγ γ= − − +
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every poor family from non-child labour sources including the cash transfer i.e. (W G+ ) rises.36 
So the supply of child labour by each family, Cl , indeed falls due to both income and price 
effects.37 On the other hand, the expanding advanced agriculture draws capital from the formal 
manufacturing sector (sector 3) causing the latter sector to contract both in terms of output and 
employment. So, a larger number of adult workers are now absorbed in the two agricultural 
sectors each of them sending a lower number of children to the job market. The effect on the 
aggregate child labour supply at this stage remains inconclusive. However, our analysis shows 
that the net effect will be an unambiguous fall in the aggregate supply of child labour in the 
society.38 A recent empirical study by Hoop and Rosati (2014) also supports our theoretical 
findings. They have found that cash transfers as an anti-poverty strategy seems to be effective to 
reduce child labor incidence.  
 
The welfare effect of the direct cash transfer policy also works in favour of the child labour-
supplying families.39 As the aggregate non-child income of each family increases it would be 
able to consume higher amounts of all commodities including children’s leisure due to positive 
income effect. Besides, as CW has fallen it would enable the family to consume some more 
children’s leisure. Hence, the welfare of the family improves due to both income and price 
effects.40  
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 See Appendix VI. 
 
37
 Note that the opportunity cost of children’s leisure, CW , has decreased.   
 
38
 See Appendix VI for mathematical derivations. 
 
39
 See Appendix VI for mathematical proofs of this result. 
 
40
 In this connection, it may be mentioned that Chaudhuri (2010) has also found that the direct cash 
transfer scheme instead of a mid-day meal program is likely to be effective in eradicating the problem of 
child labour and in improving welfare of the poor families.  
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4.2      Capital led growth 
 
Another alternative policy to combat child labour could be fostering economic growth through 
FDI that attacks the problem from both the demand side and the supply side.41 Our analyses so 
far suggest that a policy that works through the supply side as well as the demand side of the 
problem is likely to be effective under the given circumstances. Economic growth through FDI is 
such a policy and is likely to expand advanced agriculture and lower the demand for child labour 
simply because it uses mechanized techniques of cultivation.42 To capture the effects of FDI 
totally differentiating equations (1), (2), (4) – (6), (7.1), (8) and (11), solving and simplifying we 
get the following results.43, 44 
Proposition 6: An inflow of foreign capital leads to (i) an increase in adult wage, W ; (ii) a 
fall in child wage, CW ; (iii) an increase in the )/( CWW  ratio; and, (iv) and an expansion (a 
contraction) of the advanced (backward) agricultural sector. The manufacturing sector also 
expands owing to capital inflows. All these lead to an unambiguous fall in the aggregate supply 
of child labour in the economy. Welfare of each child labour-supplying family also improves as a 
consequence.  
 
Foreign capital inflows raise the capital stock of the economy. But the rate of return to capital 
does not change as it is determined from equation (3). Both the capital-using sectors i.e. sector 1 
and sector 3 expand.45 This raises the demand for adult labour. Consequently, the adult wage in 
                                                          
41
 This point would be clear from the subsequent analysis. 
 
42
 In our analysis, the distinction between domestic capital and foreign capital is not important. So the 
results as summarized in proposition 4 would remain the same if instead of foreign capital one talks about 
growth due to domestic capital formation. The distinction is only important if we want to investigate the 
consequence of the policy on national welfare because in the trade literature on FDI and welfare the 
standard assumption is that earnings by foreign capital are completely repatriated. See, for example, 
Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009, 2014) among others.  
 
43
 For mathematical derivations see Appendices II and III. 
 
44
 Here foreign capital and domestic capital are perfect substitutes.  
 
45
 See Appendix III. 
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the two agricultural sectors,W , rises. This lowers the return to land, R (see equation (1)). Sector 
2 must contract so as to release additional land required for expansion of sector 1. The 
contracting backward agriculture (sector 2) also supplies additional adult labour to the expanding 
other two sectors. The demand for child labour goes down as backward agriculture contracts that 
lowers the child wage rate, CW . AsW rises and CW  falls the ratio between adult wage and child 
wage )/( CWW
 
increases unambiguously. This in turn lowers the supply of child labour by each 
poor working household. On the other hand, as sector 3 has expanded both in terms of output and 
employment the number of poor working families engaged in the two agricultural sectors falls. 
So, we have a situation where there are fewer potential child labour supplying families with each 
of them sending a fewer number of children to workplace. Thus, both the forces work together 
and result in an unambiguous fall in the aggregate supply of child labour in the society46.  
 
The welfare effect of FDI led growth also works in favour of the child labour-supplying 
families.47 As mentioned earlier FDI raises the competitive adult wage (W ) but lowers child 
wage rate ( CW ).  An increase in adult wage income generates a positive income effect that raises 
consumption of all the commodities including children’s leisure, ( Cn l− ). The latter rises even 
further as its opportunity cost ( CW ) has decreased. Welfare of each family improves 
unequivocally as consumption levels of all commodities including children’s leisure have 
increased. 
 
 
                                                          
46
 Some researchers may argue that multinational enterprises invest in countries where the extent of child 
labour is relatively high so that they can exploit lax labour standards prevailing in the developing world. 
This leads to more decentralization of production process in terms of subcontracting. Empirical 
investigation by Braun and Busse (2003) that uses cross country information, however, indicates that 
child labour on the contrary deters foreign direct investment. There are, however, valid arguments how 
foreign capital can have negative impacts on the economy in terms of land grabbing, exploitation of 
labour etc. In this paper, we have considered only two issues, namely; the child labour problem and 
welfare of the poor families. Foreign capital can have many effects (both positive and negative) on the 
economy and policy makers should analyse those effects more carefully before resorting to this policy. In 
this context, it is worthwhile to mention that some of these issues have been discussed in Chaudhuri and 
Mukhopadhyay (2014). 
 
47
 See Appendix V for mathematical proofs of this result. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
The paper has provided a theoretical explanation why subsidy policies to agriculture especially 
designed to benefit poorer section of the working population in the agricultural sector of the 
economy are not capable of mitigating the incidence of child labour and simultaneously 
improving welfare of the poor families that supply child labour. It is a common belief that 
agriculture should be subsidized as poorer groups of the working population are employed in this 
sector who send many of their children out to work to supplement low family incomes. If 
economic conditions of these people can be improved the social menace of child could 
automatically be mitigated. The analysis of this paper has challenged this populist belief by using 
a three-sector general equilibrium model with child labour and agricultural dualism. The 
advanced agriculture is distinguished from backward agriculture as follows. The former uses 
capital in the form of agricultural machineries that prevent child labour to work in these farms. 
On the contrary, backward agriculture uses primitive techniques of cultivation and employs child 
labour in a significant number. Apart from this, backward agriculture uses more labour-intensive 
(adult labour) technique vis-à-vis advanced agriculture with respect to land. In this set-up we 
have shown that a price subsidy policy designed to benefit the poorer section of the working 
population that affects the child labour problem only through the supply side cannot ultimately 
be able to deliver the goods. Although the policy exerts a downward pressure on the child labour 
incidence through the supply side by raising adult wage income it increases the demand for child 
labour through an expansion of backward agriculture. But as the demand side effect dominates 
over the supply side effect the incidence of child labour gets a boost although welfare of the poor 
families improves. On the contrary, a subsidy policy to benefit advanced agriculture mitigates 
the child labour problem only at the cost of welfare of the poorer group of the working families. 
So, our analysis clearly demonstrates that the indirect poverty alleviation programs through 
subsidies to agriculture irrespective of whether advanced or backward would not be able to 
achieve both the targets concurrently. As possible alternatives we have analyzed the efficacies of 
a direct cash transfer program to poor families and a policy of growth via FDI. We have found 
that each of these two policies can tackle the problem of child labour through both demand and 
supply sides. These policies increase incomes from non-child labour source(s), raise the 
consumption of children’s leisure and hence lower the supply of child labour by these altruistic 
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poor families. These automatically improve their family welfare. All these effects take place 
through the supply side of the problem. On the demand side, the demand for child labour 
decreases as advanced agriculture expands that does not use child labour and backward 
agriculture contracts. This is how both demand and supply side effects work together to lessen 
the gravity of the child labour incidence.   
 
It should, however, be mentioned that the policy of promotion of economic growth via FDI is believed to 
work on poverty primarily through the so-called ‘percolation effects’. Higher economic growth means 
higher economic activities which in turn would lead to higher employment and wages and hence less 
poverty. However, in a developing economy with labour market imperfections and chronic 
unemployment, this ‘percolation theory’ may not always work and produce the desired results. It is, of 
course, true that higher economic growth will lead to higher government revenues. But, there is no 
gainsaying that the additional public resources should necessarily be redistributed among the poorer 
section of the working population so as to enable them to derive at least a part of the benefits accrued due 
to FDI. Hence, the importance of redistribution of income remains quite crucial and a direct cash transfer 
scheme is possibly the best way to achieve that objective of a welfare state. 
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that certain assumptions of the paper are restrictive and the 
structure of the model may seem to be constructed with a view to derive certain preconceived 
results. For example, child labour is used only in backward agriculture, nothing has been said 
about how the subsidies are financed, and the effects of the policies on national welfare have not 
been studied. However, these may be defended as follows. One may quite easily introduce an 
informal sector (say, sector M) that either produces a non-traded intermediate good for the 
formal sector (sector 3) by means of adult labour, child labour and capital or a non-traded final 
good/services with the help of two types of labour that is consumed by the richer section of the 
population consisting of adult workers employed in sector 3 earning a high unionized wage, 
landowners and capitalists. However, it may intuitively be checked that most of the important 
results of the paper hold under different sufficient conditions containing terms of relative 
intensities in which child labour and the other input(s) are used in the two child labour-using 
sectors.48 Furthermore, considering national income at domestic or international prices as the 
measure of social welfare it would not be difficult in analyzing the effects of different policies on 
                                                          
48
 See also footnote 15 in this context. 
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social welfare. Finally, despite abstraction and simplicity the results of this model are important 
because these can at least question the desirability of the indirect poverty alleviation programs 
through distortionary agricultural subsidies and suggest alternative policies which can 
successfully eradicate the menace of child labour from the system and improve welfare of the 
poorer section of the working population.  
 
Appendix I: Derivation of family supply function of child labour  
 
Maximizing equation (8) with respect to 321 ,, CCC and Cl  and subject to the budget constraint (9) the 
following first-order conditions are obtained.  
1 2 2 3 3(( ) / ) (( ) / ( )) (( ) / ( )) (( ) / ( ) )C CU C U P C U PC U n l Wα β ρ γ= = = −                              (A.1) 
From (A.1) we get the following expressions. 
1 { ( ) / }C CC n l Wα γ= −                                                                                                            (A.2) 
2 2{ ( ) / ( )}C CC n l W Pβ γ= −                                                                                                    (A.3) 
)}/()({ 33 PWlnC CC γρ −=                                                                                                      (A.4)                                                  
 
Substitution of the values of 1C , 2C and 3C into the budget constraint and further simplifications give us 
the following child labour supply function of each poor working household. 
 
{(1 ) ( / )}C Cl n W Wγ γ= − −                                                                                                     (10) 
 
Appendix II: Changes in factor prices 
 
As r is determined from equation (3), it is independent of any changes in 2P and K .  In other words, we 
have ˆ 0.r =  
 
Now we totally differentiate equations (1), (2), (4) – (6) and (7.1), collecting terms and arranging in a 
matrix notation we get the following expression. 
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              (A.5) 
where: 
 
1 2
1 2( ) 0;LL L LL L LLS S Sλ λ= + <
 
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2[{ ( ) }( )L LC CC L N N L
C C
WS A S A
l W
γλ θ θ θ θ∆ = − − −  
       
1 2
1 2 1 1 3 2{ ( ) }] 0N C LL K KL CL
C C
WS A S A S A
l W
γθ θ λ+ − − + <  
                                                                                   (A.6) 
2 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 2( ) 0K N L L N K L NA λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ= − + >  
3 1
3 2 3 1 1 3 1
3 3
1 ( ) 0
1 1
L L
N L L N L L
L L
A λ λλ λ λ λ λ λλ λ= + = >− −  
 
12
1 2 1 2( ) 0N L L NNLλ λ λ λ λ= − >  as we have assumed that the backward agricultural sector is more adult 
labour-intensive vis-à-vis the advanced agricultural sector with respect to land both in physical and value 
sense. The latter implies that 1 2 1 2( ) 0L N N Lθ θ θ θ− <  which in turn shows that 0∆ < .  
 
Solving (A.5) by Cramer’s rule the following expressions are obtained. 
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ{ ( ) }
         (-)          (+)            (-)         (+)      (+)   (-)           (+)
L LC CC N N C
C C
WW S A S A P A K
l W
γλ θ θ θ= − − − −
∆ ∆
                                             (A.7) 
1 2
1 1 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ{ ( ) } ( )
        (-)  (-) (+)            (+)        (+)         (+)      (+)  (-)             (-)           (+)
C LL K KL CL N L N N L
C C
WW S A S A S A P A K
l W
γλ θ θ θ θ θ= − − + − −
∆ ∆
                (A.8) 
3
1 1 2 1 3
3
( ) 0
1
L
K N N K
L
A λλ λ λ λλ= + >−
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2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ{ ( ) }
      (-)           (+)          (-)         (+)     (+)   (-)          (+)
L LC CC L L C
C C
WR S A S A P A K
l W
γλ θ θ θ= − − +
∆ ∆
                                                  (A.9) 
                                                                                                 
Now subtraction of (A.8) from (A.7) yields 
2 2 2 1
1 2 2 1 3 1 2
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ ( ) ( ) )]C L LC LL CC CL K KL NW W A S S A S S S A Pλ λ θ− = − + − + −∆  
                 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1
ˆ{ ( )}N C L N N L A Kθ θ θ θ θ θ− − −∆                              
Using the expression of LLS from (A.6) we can further simplify the expression of ˆ ˆ( )CW W− as follows.   
1 1
1 1 1 3 1 2
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ ]
                     (-)   (+)  (-)              (+)     (+)
C L LL K KL NW W A S S A Pλ λ θ− = − −∆  
                                               
1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1
ˆ{ ( )}
   (-)                          (-)                (+)
N C L N N L A Kθ θ θ θ θ θ− − −∆                                (A.10) 
 [Note that  2 2( ) 0CC CLS S+ =  and 2 2( ) 0LL LCS S+ = , (note that as 2Na is constant 2 0CNS = and 2 0LNS = .] 
 
Using (A.6), from (A.7) – (A.9) and (A.10) we can obtain the following results.                                                            
(i) ˆ ˆ0, 0W R> <  and ˆ 0CW > when 2ˆ 0P > ;                                                                                   
(ii) ˆ ˆ( ) 0CW W− <  when 2ˆ 0P >  
(iii) ˆ ˆ0, 0W R> <  and ˆ 0CW < when ˆ 0K > ;                (A.11) 
(iv) ˆ ˆ( ) 0CW W− >   when  ˆ 0K >    
 
 
Appendix III: Changes in output composition 
 
Solving (A.5) by Cramer’s Rule we can derive the following expressions as well. 
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 [We have used the expression of LLS  and note that 
2 2 0LC LLS S+ =  and 2 2 0CC CLS S+ = ] 
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N C LL N CL N L L N
C C
WS S K
l W
γθ θ λ λ λ λ λ+ − + −
             (A.14) 
 
From (A.12) - (A.14) we get the following  
(v) 1 2ˆ ˆ0, 0X X< > when 2ˆ 0P > ; 
(vi) 3ˆ 0X < when 2ˆ 0P >    
          under the sufficient condition that 121 12 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS Sλ λ λ+ ≥               (A.15) 
(vii) 1 2ˆ ˆ0, 0X X> < when ˆ 0K > ;       
(viii) 3ˆ 0X > when ˆ 0K > .                                                                     
 
Also note that 3 3ˆ ˆK X= where 3 3 3KK a X=  (this is because 3ˆ 0Ka = ). So, 
(ix) 3ˆ 0K < when 2ˆ 0P > ; and,                   (A.16) 
(x) 3ˆ 0K > when ˆ 0K > . 
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Appendix IV: Proof of proposition 3 
 
Totally differentiating equation (11) we get the following 
3
3
3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )
L
C C
C C L
WL W W X
l W
λγ
λ= − − − −  
We now substitute the expressions of  3ˆX   and  ˆ ˆ( )CW W−    from (A.14) and (A.10) respectively to get 
the following expression. 
                         
1 1
1 1 1 3
1
ˆ
- [- ( - )
            (-)                     (-)       ( )
C L LL K KL
C C
WL A S S A
l W
γ λ λ=
∆
+
       
           
122 1 2 1 13
2 1 2 1 1 1 2
3
ˆ{ ( )( )} ](1 )
                             (+)                    (-)              (+)                  (-)             (+)
L
L LC KL N CC KL N L LL K NNL
L C C
WS S S S S P
l W
λ γλ λ λ λ λ λ θλ− − + − +−
      
            
1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 [ { ( )}
   (-)          (+)              (-)                   (+)                         
   
N C L N N L
C C
W A
l W
γ θ θ θ θ θ θ+ − −
∆
 
              
2 23
2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
3
{{ ( )( )}( )(1 )
                            (+)              (-)                   (+)                          (-)
L
L LC N CC N L L N L N N L
L C C
WS S
l W
λ γλ λ λ λ λ λ θ θ θ θλ− − − − −−
 
                      
2
1 2 1 1 2 1 2
ˆ{ ( )( )}}]
               (-)                (+)                    (+)
N C LL N CL N L L N
C C
WS S K
l W
γθ θ λ λ λ λ λ+ − + −
                                (A.17) 
 
From (A.17) we get the following results. 
ˆ 0CL > when 2ˆ 0P >  under the sufficient condition 
121 1
2 1{ } 0KL N L LLNLS Sλ λ λ+ ≥  
 
Rewriting (A.17) in a different way it can be checked that the above result also hold under the sufficient 
condition that 2 1 2 1LC KL CC LLS S S S≥ . 
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Appendix V: Effects on family welfare  
 
We substitute the optimum values of consumption of commodities ( 1 2,C C and 3C ) (from equations 
(A.2) - (A.4)) and children’s leisure ( )Cn l− ( from equation (10)) into the utility function (equation 
(8)) to get the following expression. 
( )
( )
C
C
nW WV H
W γ
+
=                                                                                                                   (A.18) 
 where V  stands for family welfare and 
2 3
( ) ( ) ( ) 0H A
P P
α β ρα β ργ
γ γ γ
= >
.
 
Totally differentiating the above expression we get the following. 
ˆ ˆ( )
ˆ
( )
C C C
C
l W W WWV
nW W
+
=
+
                                                                                                   (A.19) 
 
From the above expression it is clear that family welfare is an increasing function of both 
W and CW . 
 
We now substitute ˆW and ˆCW  from (A.7) and (A.8) into (A.19) to get the following.                    
2 2 1
2 1 2 1 1 3
1
ˆ [ { ( ) } {( )
       (-)                                 (+)             (-)        (+)       (-)             (+)
L LC CC LL K KL
C C C
WV W S A S A S A S A
nW W l W
γλ λ= − − − + −
∆ +
        
2
2 1 2
ˆ( ) }]
          (+)       (+)
CL N
C C
WS A P
l W
γ θ− + 1 2 2 1 2 3
1
ˆ[ ( ) ]( )
  (-)                                                            (+)          (+)
N C C C L C C L N
C
W l W l W A K
nW W
θ θ θ θ θ− − +
∆ +
      (A.20)                                      
 
Now from (A.20) we have 
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 1 1 2 2
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]( )
C C L C
C C C L C C C C
L L
WW WW a a XW l W a a l a
P P a X a X
θ θ− = − = −
+
 
                             
2 1 1
1 1 2 2
( ) 0.C L
L L
W a X
a X a X
θ
= >
+
           (A.21) 
(obtained after using (4), (7), (10) and (11).)       
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From (A.20) and (A.21) we can obtain the following results.                                                           
(i) ˆ 0V >  when 2ˆ 0P > ;                                                                                   
(ii) ˆ 0V >  when ˆ 0K > .  
 
 
Appendix VI: Effects of a change in G on child labour incidence  
 
As we introduce direct cash transfer in our model this modifies the family child labour supply 
function (equation 12). This will modify equation (7.1) and its modified form would be as 
follows. 
2 2 3 3[(1 ) {( ) / }]( )C C La X n W G W L a Xγ γ= − − + −                                                         (7.2) 
 
Thus, the aggregate supply function of child labour in the economy is now given by                                                                 
3 3[(1 ) {( ) / }]( )C C LL n W G W L a Xγ γ= − − + −                                                       (11.1)                                                                        
 
Now totally differentiate equations (1), (2), (4) – (6) and (7.2) and then solving by Cramer’s rule 
the following expressions are obtained. 
1 2 2
1
ˆˆ
       (-)           (+)
N C
C C
GW A G
l W
γθ θ=
∆
                                                                                             (A.22) 
1 2 1 2 2
1
ˆˆ ( )
           (-)            (-)         (+)
C L N N L
C C
GW A G
l W
γθ θ θ θ= − −
∆
                                                                          (A.23)       
1 2
3 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1
ˆ [ ( )
         (-)              (+)                    (+)                   (-)
N C L K KL L LC K N L N N LX S Sθ θ λ λ λ λ λ θ θ θ θ= − −∆                               
                     
1 2 1 2
ˆ]
             (-)
N C LL K N
C C
GS G
l W
γθ θ λ λ−
                                                                    (A.24) 
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where, 2 22 1 2 1 2 1 2
( )[{ ( ) }( )L LC CC L N N L
C C
W GS A S A
l W
γλ θ θ θ θ+∆ = − − −  
                      
1 2
1 2 1 1 3 2{ ( ) }] 0N C LL K KL CL
C C
WS A S A S A
l W
γθ θ λ+ − − + <
                                (A.25) 
 
Now, let the family income from non-child labour sources be denoted by M W G= +   
So, ˆˆ ˆM WW GG= +
                                                                                                    (A.26) 
Substituting (A.22) in (A.26) and simplifying we can obtain the following expression. 
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 ( )
ˆ [{ ( ) }( )
       (-)           (+)              (-)                                (-)
L LC CC L N N L
C C
W GM S A S A
l W
γλ θ θ θ θ+= − − −
∆
 
                
1 2
1 2 1 1 3 2
ˆ{ }]
                (-)               (+)       (+)
N C LL K KL CLS A S A S A GGθ θ λ+ − −
                                                     (A.27) 
From (A.27) one can easily check that ˆ 0M >  when ˆ 0.G >  
 
Using (A.22) -- (A.24) and (A.27), the following results follow.                                                             
(i) ˆ 0W <  and ˆ 0CW < when ˆ 0G > ;              
(ii) 3ˆ 0X <  when ˆ 0G > ; and, 
(iii) 0M >
 when 0G > .                                                            
                                                  
To examine the effect of a change in G on the aggregate child labour supply we totally 
differentiate equation (11.1) and obtain the following expression.  
3
3
3
( )
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
(1 )
L
C C
C C C C C C L
G W W GL G W W X
l W l W l W
λγ γ γ
λ
+
= − − + −
−
                           (A.28)
 
 
Using (A.22) – (A.24) in (A.28) and simplifying the following expression can be obtained. 
 
33 
 
2
2 1 2 1 2
1 ( )
ˆ [ ( ) ( )
            (-)           (-)                (+)          (-)
C CC L N N L
C C
W GL S A
l W
γ θ θ θ θ+= − − − −
∆
                       
 
               
2
1 2 2 1 2 1 2
( )
ˆ( )]
            (+)             (+)                  (-)
N C CL L N N L
C C C C
W G GS A G
l W l W
γ γθ θ θ θ θ θ+− + −
                                    (A.29)
                        
From (A.29) we get the following results. 
ˆ 0CL <
 
when ˆ 0G > . 
 
Appendix VII: Effect of a change in G on family welfare 
 
Introduction of cash transfer in the model will alter equation (A.19) as follows. 
 
                                                                     (A.30) 
 
After substituting ˆW and ˆCW  from (A.22) and (A.23) in (A.30) and simplifying one finds  
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 ( )
ˆ [{ ( ) }( )( )
       (-)                                   (+)             (-)                               (-)
L LC CC L N N L
C C C
W GV S A S A
G nW W l W
γλ θ θ θ θ+= − − −
∆ + +
 
                                    
1 2
1 2 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
ˆ{ } ( ]
               (-)              (+)                  (+)               (+)
N C LL K KL L N N L C CLS A S A G GA GA S Gθ θ λ γ θ θ θ γθ θ+ − − + −
                        
(A.31) 
From (A.30) the following result follows.                                                           
ˆ 0V >  when ˆ 0G >  under the sufficient condition 22 2( ) 0L C CLSγθ θ− ≤  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
ˆ
( )
C C C
C
GG l W W WWV
G nW W
+ +
=
+ +
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